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TOUCHED AND KNIT IN THE LIFE: 
BARCLAY'S RELATIONAL THEOLOGY 
AND CARTESIAN DUALISM 
R. Melvin Keiser 
Guilford College, Greensboro, North Carolina, USA 
ABSTRACT 
I argue in this paper that Robert Barclay fundamentally uses a relational method in 
doing theology notwithstanding a growing scholarly consensus that his thought is 
shaped by Cartesian dualism. The claims of dualism in Barclay are assessed through a 
close textual interpretation of parts of his 1676 work, An Apology for the True 
Christian Divinity, and his subsequent essay 'The Possibility and Necessity of the 
Inward and Immediate Revelation of the Spirit of God'. While he explicitly engages 
Cartesian dualism in this latter work, my conclusion is that when he is arguing 
apologetically with someone employing dualist categories, as in this essay, he uses 
Cartesian language in order to find common ground with his audience; but when he 
reflects on his own experience, he thinks relationally rather than dualistically. That 
he does not disjoin the self from God, other selves, or its own body, nor does he 
separate the inward and biblical Christ, has been obscured by his apologetic use of 
Cartesian dualism. In recognizing his relational approach, we can discover in 
Barclay's thought a resource for doing Quaker theology today that responds to 
George Fox's question, 'What canst thou say?'. 
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Robert Barclay's theology is a laboratory for discovering one's own 
Quaker way of doing theology. Controversy has swirled around him 
both in his lifetime and ever since. While alive he argued extensively 
with Puritans. Mter his death Friends have either claimed him for their 
side in fratricidal conflict or rejected him for distorting Quaker ways of 
thinking. Having wrestled with him since my youth, both to understand 
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him and to figure out my own Quaker approach to theology, I recom­
mend him as a challenge to head and heart in exploring how to say 
'what thou canst'. 
Amid his arguments with Puritans, Barclay develops, I want to show, 
a Quaker way of doing theology-using a relational method which 
contrasts significantly with Puritans' use of a dualistic method and dog­
matic thinking. Two-thirds of the way through his work An Apology for 
the True Christian Divinity (1908 [1676]) Barclay speaks of his convince­
ment as being touched in the heart by the life and power among people 
gathered in silent worship. This is the beginning of his relational 
theology-relating to selves open in their depths and to the divine 
presence moving in their midst. Theological thinking, like messages 
delivered in meeting, emerges from these non-rational depths of shared 
silence. Knowledge of Scripture and Christian principles does not 
precede such experience but rather emerges out of such experienced 
depths: 'afterwards the knowledge and understanding of principles will 
not be wanting, but will grow up so much as is needful, as the natural 
fruit of this good root' (Barclay 1908: 340). 
While this non-dualistic way of thinking can be shown in the work of 
George Fox, Margaret Fell, and Isaac Penington (see Keiser 1984, 1986, 
1991 a-c, 1997), Barclay draws upon Descartes implicitly in his Apology 
and explicitly in an essay entitled 'The Possibility and Necessity of the 
Inward and Immediate Revelation of the Spirit of God' (Barclay 1831 
[1676]). Scholars have concluded that Barclay is, therefore, irretrievably 
dualistic. Barclay's explicit engagement with Cartesian dualism has 
obscured for them his relational way of doing theology and the meaning 
of this engagement within his apologetic context. To show that 
Barclay's way of doing theology is relational, it is necessary to confront 
this charge of dualism by exploring his use of Descartes. 
Cartesian Dualism and Relational Thinking 
Under the impact of the rise of modern science, Rene Descartes 
between 1619-1650 carefully crafted a mind/body dualism from the 
Greek spirit/matter hierarchy, in order to free the scientific exploration 
of the natural world from ecclesiastical and theological domination and 
to protect the realm of selves and its truth from science's encroachments. 
While English intellectuals, such as the Cambridge Platonist, Henry 
More, were excited by Descartes' philosophy, danger was recognized in 
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his mechanistic view of body and world alien to the personal. Less 
recognized at the time, Descartes initiated for both rationalist and 
empiricist modern philosophy an insatiable search for absolute rational 
certainty through the method of doubt. The result, however, as Michael 
Polanyi so well has shown (see Polanyi: 1958, 1966), has been 
scepticism and totalitarianism, for the method attempts to uproot all 
commitments by which we dwell in the world. 
Dualism means a separation of realms so there is no interaction 
between or participation in one another. Descartes' dualism isolates 
mind and body from each other totally (except for his dubious effort to 
connect them at the pineal gland). The theological implications are to 
separate self and God, self and world, and the experienced Christ from 
the biblical Christ. The mind severed from the body's participation in 
and interaction with the world looks out from its enclosure upon a 
world of objects-natural, human, and divine-to which it is unrelated 
and about which it is uncertain. The biblical Christ as external to the 
knowing self similarly becomes problematic: how can we know with 
certitude anything that happens in history? 
Descartes thought he discovered a foundation of absolute certainty in 
the self, specifically in critical reason. In his realization of Cogito ergo sum 
( ' I  think therefore I am') he grounded reason in reason: he realized in 
doubting all things, he could not doubt that he was doubting. He did 
not apply his methodology of doubt to God's existence. Rather he 
found ideas of God within his reason that he believed only God could 
have caused since they were of perfection and we as imperfect creatures 
could not have made them. On the basis of trust in such a perfect 
creator Descartes decided he could depend sufficiently on his senses to 
convey a knowable world, but the point of certainty was in reason itself, 
not in sensuous relations to the world. Protestantism found certainty in 
the Scriptures; even though external to the self, its objective certainty 
was assured by God's self-validating revelation. The separation of God 
and Christ from our minds was thus bridged by this contact point with 
the divine through Scripture as the certain Word of God. 
But the Quaker way, which will be seen in Barclay, was to look for 
certainty neither in reason nor in Scripture, but in personal experience. 
Through pairs of terms, Friends spoke of inward and outward, life and 
form, spirit and letter, silence and words in such a way that the first term 
was a dimension of depth in the latter term. While some recent Quaker 
scholars construe these pairs as dualistically separate in Barclay, I want to 
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show that they were in fact used by him as inter-related, with the former 
participating in the latter and the latter emerging from the former. 
Inwardness was the level of life and spirit that Barclay and his seven­
teenth-century Quaker contemporaries descended to over and over 
again in meeting for worship and daily living. From this spiritual dimen­
sion word and action emerged filled with vitality as outward forms. The 
outward was thus the inward made manifest; the inward was the out­
ward in potentiality. Only when these split apart so the outward form 
was empty of life, or the inward vitality was prevented from coming to 
expression, was there a problem. 
But the certainty embraced here in inwardness was a 'lived' certainty 
rather than a rational one-the assurance that comes in experience of 
things that are deep, that feel really real and ultimately significant, that 
transform lives and call forth the giving of one's life in commitment. As 
a lived certainty, it is better to speak of this as a trust and confidence 
since it does not eliminate, as rational certitude attempts to, the many 
ambiguities of living. 
By this relational mode of religious knowing, Barclay and other early 
Friends held together interactively self and God, mind and body, self and 
world, and the experiential and biblical Christ. They did this by seeing 
God as a transcendent presence within the self, the mind as an embodied 
consciousness discerning truth through the spiritually enlivened physical 
senses, the self as inherently connected with all creatures within the 
original creation present in our depths, and Christ as the eternal divine 
presence dwelling in all people and in fullest measure in Jesus. 
A Growing Scholarly Consensus on Dualism in Barclay 
There is a growing consensus among Quaker scholars, however, that 
Barclay's involvement with Cartesian thought is a capitulation to it, 
setting the stage for the development of Quietism and its separations of 
mind from body, divine from human, and the inward Christ from the 
outward biblical Christ. Maurice Creasey says that 
at the hands of Robert Barclay, and largely in terms of a confused and 
illegitimate application of the originally clear and valid distinction 
between 'inward' and 'outward', Quakerism became wedded to a preva­
lent and quasi-Cartesian dualism and, as a consequence, set its feet upon 
paths which, for many a year, led it into the barren places of quietism and 
formalism (Creasey 1962: 20). 
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He argues that in Fox and Penington 'outward' and 'inward' were used 
to distinguish 'a formal or conventional or notional knowledge of 
Christianity as a body of "revealed truths" and religious and ethical prac­
tices' from 'a transforming and creative personal acquaintance with and 
relation to Christ in the Spirit' ( 1962: 5). But Barclay, according to 
Creasey, distinguishes these as 
a contrast between two modes of revelation, and . . .  between two distinct 
organs whereby these modes of revelation are respectively received. 
There is no recognition of any possiblity [sic] of mutual interaction or 
communication or influence between these two modes, or these two 
organs (1962: 12). 
Barclay has taken, Creasey explains, the earlier definition of inward and 
outward as two different ways to apprehend the same revelation given in 
history, and turned it into 'two kinds of Revelation', one of which is 
'without any essential connection with History' and is known by an 
'organ within man, which yet is no part of man's essential being, depen­
dent in no way upon the constitution of man's mind' ( 1962: 22). The 
reason for this presumed separation is Barclay's imbibing Cartesian dual­
ism. Thus 'Quakerism early took the form of a kind of spiritualized 
Cartesianism' leaving it as 'a religious movement lacking an adequate 
intellectual formulation and means of self-criticism' ( 1962: 23). Over 
against this 'religion of immanence', Creasey proposes 'a religion of 
incarnation' in which 'the "inward" made itself known in and through 
the "outward", and is still to be encountered only so' ( 1962: 23-24)­
that is, through the Jesus of Scripture, the J ohannine incarnate Word. 
Mel Endy agrees with Creasey about Cartesian dualism in Barclay but 
sees this separation of inward and outward going back to Fox and the 
beginnings of Quakerism (Endy 1973: 76-77), stemming from Cartesian 
and Platonic thought ( 1973: 183). He sees in Barclay 'spiritual­
corporeal' and 'divine-human' dualisms-the former because Barclay 
separates the physical and spiritual senses, and the latter because the 
human is made entirely passive, with no free will, as the old self, its will 
and personality, is annihilated and replaced by the Spirit and will of God 
( 1973: 68-84, 183-89). 
John Punshon suggests that 'Barclay unintentionally expressed the 
central ambiguity of Quakerism and posed a problem which the evan­
gelical and liberal traditions were later to solve in characteristically dif­
ferent ways' (Punshon 1984: 122). The evangelical tradition, overlook­
ing Barclay's relegation of Scripture to secondary authority, springs from 
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his theological development of redemption through Christ. And the 
liberal tradition, overlooking Barclay's holding the mystical light and 
historical Jesus in an 'indissoluble link', springs from his development of 
this inward spiritual reality. With Creasey, and in contrast to Endy, 
Punshon sees a significant difference between Barclay and Fox: 
Then there is a tantalising difference in atmosphere between the two 
men. Barclay is obviously a scholar, at home with the Fathers as well as 
the Bible, capable of taking nice points and making fine distinctions. Fox 
breathes the air of an Amos or Paul, and sees the whole sweep of God's 
covenant relationship with his Church in a far more dramatic and con­
crete way. Basically, Barclay has put Quakerism into a quietist kind of 
straitjacket by his philosophical dualism and distrust of the powers of the 
human mind. Fox's profoundly scriptural faith contains so many coun­
terweights to enthusiasm in one direction that there is a diversity and 
comprehensiveness there that Barclay has not quite caught (Punshon 
1984: 125 [see also pp. 120-25]). 
In the most recent consideration of Barclay's dualism, Hugh Pyper 
similarly identifies Barclay as Cartesian in interpreting him as represent­
ing the self as an 'individual [who] is fundamentally a mental being' 
(Pyper 1998: 16). But he qualifies this by recognizing the experiential 
and communal dimension in Barclay's thought evident in his convince­
ment. Yet he argues that Barclay's theological and philosophical com­
mitments to dualism 'do not allow him to express them [i.e. 'these 
communal experiences'] in his systematic writings'. Moveover, this 
'inherent dualism of Barclay's thought . . .  ultimately pulls apart the divine 
and the human in the incarnation'. He thus has a 'deficient doctrine of 
the Holy Spirit' because he does not distinguish between 'the spirit 
already at work in the world' and 'the power of the son at work in the 
manJesus' ( 1998: 17, 18). 
Starting with Barclay's Starting Point 
In the face of this growing scholarly consensus of Barclay's capitulation 
to Cartesian dualism, I would propose a different angle of approach in 
order to understand Barclay's use of Descartes' concepts and his way of 
thinking theologically. Rather than bringing the experiential in at the 
end of a study of Barclay as a contradiction to his assumed Cartesianism, 
as Pyper has done, I suggest we start from experience in community 
since that is the context of his convincement and hence the springboard 
for all his Quaker reflections. From this perspective we can follow him 
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developing a non-dualistic theology, though admittedly not into its full­
ness, and eventually return to the question of the meaning of the apolo­
getic form of his thinking, which Pyper has so well discussed ( 1998: 
6-8), for his engagement with Cartesian dualism. Before I turn to 
explore the relational nature of his convincement and subsequent 
reflection, it is important to assess Barclay's epistemological emphasis as 
he begins his Apology, for it is here that the unmistakable influence of 
Descartes can be seen. 
Writing for university-trained readers in the common scholastic form 
of rational argumentative defence of propositions, making each chapter 
an elaboration of a stated proposition, Barclay starts his book by 
establishing the true foundation of knowledge. Within the latter half of 
the seventeenth century this suggests two particular influences-John 
Calvin and Descartes. Calvin in 1559 begins his Institutes of the Christian 
Religion: 'Nearly all the wisdom we possess, that is to say, true and sound 
wisdom, consists of two parts: the knowledge of God and of ourselves' 
(Calvin 1960: 35). Calvin here shifts the focus from mediaeval preoccu­
pation with being to the modern question of knowing. A century later 
Descartes fixes epistemology as the central question and starting point 
for modern philosophy. But he intensifies the quality of what is sought, 
redefining 'true and sound wisdom' as certain knowledge: as that 'which 
I knew to be true and certain' (Descartes 1958: 1 19). The influence of 
both Calvin and Descartes is evident in the title of Barclay's first propo­
sition: 'Concerning the True Foundation of Knowledge' ( 1908: 23) . 
Furthermore, when he speaks of what he wants to find as 'quietness and 
peace in the certain knowledge of God' ( 1908: 24), he exhibits 
Descartes' preoccupation with certainty. 
When Barclay speaks of his convincement, however, he uses an 
epistemological approach that shows no trace of Cartesianism: 
For not a few have come to be convinced of the truth after this manner, 
of which I myself, in part, am a true witness, who not by strength of 
arguments, or by a particular disquisition of each doctrine, and 
convincement of my understanding thereby, came to receive and bear 
witness of the truth, but by being secretly reached by this life; for when I 
came into the silent assemblies of God's people, I felt a secret power 
among them, which touched my heart, and as I gave way unto it, I found 
the evil weakening in me, and the good raised up, and so I became thus 
knit and united unto them, hungering more and more after the increase 




He speaks of being convinced by the truth as the divine life reached and 
touched his heart in the silence of meeting for worship. Not by rational 
argument and theological inquiry that would convince the understand­
ing, but by the power of the divine life he felt among the assembly 
gathered in silence, did he receive the truth. The effect of being touched 
by and giving way to the life was to discover the evil within himself 
weakened and the good strengthened, himself to be knit and united 
with the worshippers, and a hunger to feel himself fully redeemed. 
Mind and body are not split apart. In entering physically into this 
space where people are sitting in silent worship, he is touched in his 
mind, but it is the mind as heart, not as head merely (a distinction he 
uses from the beginning [see 1908: 9]). In the heart he feels and wants; it 
is the place of his passions, of affectional understanding. He is affected in 
his heart through perceiving the situation, through sensing the power in 
it, not by conceiving it. Just as his understanding is not separated from 
his body-they are working together as they are touched by the life-so 
also the self is not separated from God. The life of God is immediately 
present making its redeeming and uniting power felt in his whole bodily 
and ensouled being. While the agency is the divine life radiating from 
the gathering, so that he is acted on by this power, contrary to Endy's 
claim, Barclay is not entirely passive, for he speaks of giving way to that 
which has touched his heart. He presumably could have resisted it. 
While he will speak later of the Spirit's leading from within himself, 
here there is no annihilation of the self. Indeed, there is an enlargement 
of the self, as he not only feels the good being raised up in him (which 
presumably was already present, but not pervasive in him), but discovers 
himself, by the grace of this divine life, being brought into unity with 
these people. 
There is no dualism here of mind/body or divine/human oppositions. 
Nor are there any Cartesian concepts at work. He is using concepts­
convincement, truth, heart, life, good and evil, unity, redemption-but 
they are emerging directly from his experience as he attempts to give 
account of what he felt and the effects that followed as he entered this 
gathered meeting. Nor is there any reference to Christ outward or 
inward, except the metaphor of 'life' which is a Johannine term for both 
the inward and outward Christ. 
In his larger discussion of the eleventh chapter, Proposition XI, 
'Concerning Worship', within which this account of his convincement 
occurs, Barclay develops further his relational views of self and God, 
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mind and body. God is present 'in the midst', whose 'presence' is 
known through 'feeling' and being 'gathered' by it ( 1908: 335). Words 
in worship 'are felt to arise' from the 'pure motions and breathings of 
God's Spirit' ( 1908: 336). An intimacy is present in the divine-human 
relations in which the divine actuates the self from within it 
empowering it to 'words and actings'. Friends learn 'to wait upon 
God ...  and feel after this inward seed of life; that as it moveth, they may 
move with it, and be actuated by its power, and influenced, whether to 
pray, preach or sing' ( 1908: 337). 
'Waiting' is not passivity; it is an activity in which the ego-what 
Barclay calls 'the natural will and wisdom' and the 'imagination' ( 1908: 
335-36)-is to be laid down. Waiting thus involves 'denying self, both 
inwardly and outwardly, in a still and mere dependence upon God'. It 
involves 'being emptied as it were of himself, of all 'the workings, 
imaginations, and speculations of his own mind'. It is being 'thoroughly 
crucified to the natural products' of the self so as 'to receive the Lord', 
in which 'the little seed of righteousness which God hath planted in his 
soul.. .receives a place to arise' ( 1908: 350). 
While this place of 'holy dependence' ( 1908: 33 7) and the growth of 
'the little seed' is in inwardness, it is not separated from the outward but 
is the depth within it. 'God hath seen meet, so long as his children are in 
this world, to make use of the outward senses'. He uses them 'to convey 
spiritual life' by 'speaking, praying' which can only contribute to 
'mutual edification . . .  when we hear and see one another'. The 'seeing of 
the faces one of another, when both are inwardly gathered unto the life', 
Barclay says, 'causeth the inward life .. . the more to abound' ( 1908: 364). 
As 'many are gathered together into the same life, there is more of the 
glory of God' ( 1908: 365). So the meeting together of people 'out­
wardly in their persons', in their bodies, and 'outwardly in one place' 
( 1903: 336, 337) is important to the nurture of their inward lives. Hence 
'the name of Quakers, i.e., Tremblers': when selves engage in worship 
in 'inward travail', the inward struggle may result in an outward 
'trembling and a motion of body'. The body may be shaken resulting in 
'many groans, and sighs, and tears, even as the pangs of a woman in 
travail' ( 1908: 342). Literal birthing is used as a metaphor for the inward 
life struggling to come forth. The body, in its physical shaking, may 
show forth visibly the inward spiritual condition of giving up one's 
natural will and wisdom (see Mack 1992: 150-53). The outward 
expresses the inward. Mind and body are not separated. 
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The Senses Natural and Supernatural 
But what ofBarclay's distinction between the natural and supernatural 
senses: 'The senses are either outward or inward; and the inward senses 
are either natural or supernatural. .. [S]ome beings are natural, some 
supernatural; so some ideas are natural, some supernatural. .. ' (Barclay 
183 1: 569). Many Quaker scholars see this as evidence of the mind/ 
body split. The spiritual senses are, on the contrary, I would say, not 
only like the physical senses but work through them. What they sense is 
not light and sound as received by the outward senses but through the 
physical light and sound they sense the spiritual light and voice of God. 
Barclay says that, while voices in Scripture are usually not outward but 
inward voices, God has spoken outwardly to people through angels or 
through dreams and visions. The way in which they knew, however, 
that this was God speaking was through the spiritual sensing of the 
'secret testimony of God's Spirit in their hearts, assuring them that the 
voices, dreams, and visions were of and from God'. The outward senses 
are fallible; even hearing an outward word spoken in a mystical audition 
cannot 'credit' ( 1908: 42) this experience as from God. This can only be 
known inwardly in the heart through the Spirit's assurance. When 
Abraham entertained angels, Barclay says, he did not recognize them as 
angels through his outward senses. Seeing men walk towards him­
receiving light from them on the retina of his eyes, as we would say 
today-does not tell him their spiritual quality; it is the spiritual sense 
that does. 'And seeing the Spirit of God is within us, and not without us 
only, it speaks to our spiritual, and not to our bodily ear' ( 1908: 43). So 
also with all the other senses. Like Fox and Penington, Barclay speaks of 
the spiritual senses in terms of each of the physical senses: 'thou shalt feel 
the new man, or the spiritual birth and babe raised, which hath its 
spiritual senses, and can see, feel, taste, handle and smell the things of the 
Spirit' ( 1908: 71; for the same detailing of spiritual senses see 183 1: 574). 
The issue of the outward and inward senses is not whether there are 
two ways of knowing, or two modes of revelation, as Creasey has said, 
but how do we discern the full meaning of things? How do we catch 
the full meaning of what we perceive through our outward senses and 
are aware of occurring within us unconnected to any external 
perception? Barclay speaks of a blind man not knowing the full meaning 
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speaks of grasping the true meaning of words, heard or seen, only 
through an inward taste: 
neither can the natural man, of the largest capacity, by the best words, 
even scripture words, so well understand the mysteries of God's kingdom, 
as the least and weakest child who tasteth them, by having them revealed 
inwardly and objectively by the Spirit (1908: 71). 
What is known inwardly through this spiritual or supernatural sense 
Barclay says is 'immediate' and 'objective'. 'Immediate' means 'no men­
tion of any medium'. The meaning does not come from 'writings or 
books' but comes first hand in one's own experience. Barclay does not, 
however, recognize that any words, even those 'words put into the 
mouth' ( 1908: 55) by God, are a medium, as are the feelings one has of 
God's inward working. Nevertheless, his point is well taken, even if 
word and feeling are recognized, as they would be today, as media; God 
works immediately in the dimension of inwardness, without the medium 
of any form, which then arises into the forms of feeling and words. 
Inward revelation by the Spirit is not merely immediate but 'objec­
tive'. The inward workings of the Spirit are real and are the object of 
our faith. He says: 'That which any one firmly believes, as the ground 
and foundation of his hope in God, and life eternal, is the formal object 
of his faith' ( 1908: 43). What this formal object is is inward revelation: 
'And what was the object of their faith, but inward and immediate 
revelation' ( 1908: 45). The Protestant alternative, which Barclay 1s 
rejecting, is that Scripture is the object of faith: 
Such as deny this proposition now-a-days use here a distinction; granting 
that God is to be known by his Spirit, but again denying that it is 
immediate or inward, but in and by the scriptures; in which the mind of 
the Spirit (as they say) being fully and amply expressed, we are thereby to 
know God, and be led in all things ( 1908: 4 5-46). 
This Protestant view makes the inward revelations of the Spirit merely 
subjective, that is subordinated to the outward words of Scripture, so the 
function of the Spirit is reduced to merely understanding the objective 
words. In this view, there is no reality and meaning apart from explicit 
external forms, that is apart from the words of Scripture. This Protestant 
view believes, says Barclay: 
That the Spirit doth now lead and influence the saints, but that he doth it 
only subjectively, or in a blind manner, by enlightening their understand­
ings, to understand and believe the truth delivered in the scriptures; but 
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not at all by presenting those truths to the mind by way of object ... of 
whose working a man is not sensible (1908: 54). 
But there are 'many truths' which 'are applicable to particulars and 
individuals', Barclay argues, which 'are in nowise to be found in the 
scripture' but which we yet learn-by the Spirit, who 'objectively 
present [s] those truths to our minds' (1908: 54). 
In current philosophical language we can say Barclay is locating all 
true knowing in the inwardness of what Michael Polanyi calls the 'tacit 
dimension' (see Polanyi 1966). The reason we trust tradition (for 
Catholics) or Scripture (for Protestants) is finally that both have been 
revealed to the church 'doctors and fathers' or to the Bible writers by 
the Spirit in inwardness: 'all ends in the revelation of the Spirit' ( 1908: 
69-70). And we, in our inwardness, discern through the motion of the 
Spirit in us the presence of the Spirit in them. 
What is delivered immediately and objectively to us by the Spirit in 
our inwardness has a certainty about it: 'the divine revelation, and 
inward illumination, is that which is evident by itself, forcing the well­
disposed understanding, and irresistibly moving it to assent by its own 
evidence and clearness, even as the common principles of natural truths 
do bend the mind to a natural assent' ( 1908: 67). Like the astronomer 
who rightly calculates an eclipse, or like the mathematician who knows 
'that the three angles of a right triangle are equal to two right angles', 
the 'spiritual senses . . .  can savour the things of the Spirit, as it were in 
prima instantia, i.e., at the first blush, can discern them without, or 
before they apply them either to scripture or reason' ( 1908: 68). 
What Barclay finds as common in these examples between scientific 
and religious knowing of the spiritual senses is their instantaneity of dis­
cernment. Pyper understands Barclay as finding a different commonality: 
rational abstraction and geometrical demonstration. He rightly points 
out that 'Descartes' model of truth is geometry' which seeks truth by 
'get [ting] behind the fallen world of matter and appearance' (Pyper 
1998: 8, 9). Pyper then attributes this dualistic thinking to Barclay: 
'Barclay makes geometrical demonstration his ideal form of truth' ( 1908: 
10). He thus 'prioritises the mental over the physical. The prevailing 
model of Western anthropology has been centred on the head, on men­
tal activity and on the higher sense; the eye, the ear, and the activity of 
speech. The rest of the body tends to be relegated . . .  ' ( 1908: 1 1-12). 
While Pyper draws a reasonable inference from someone using 
astronomical and geometrical analogies, Barclay is, I believe, more subtle 
152 
QUAKER STUDIES 
to the mind by way of object ... of 
(1908: 54). 
'are applicable to particulars and 
'are in nowise to be found in the 
-by the Spirit, who 'objectively 
(1908: 54). 
· we can say Barclay is locating all 
vhat Michael Polanyi calls the 'tacit 
he reason we trust tradition (for 
mts) is finally that both have been 
fathers' or to the Bible writers by 
the revelation of the Spirit' ( 1908: 
discern through the motion of the 
in them. 
d objectively to us by the Spirit in 
1Ut it: 'the divine revelation, and 
evident by itself, forcing the well­
:Jly moving it to assent by its own 
ammon principles of natural truths 
t' ( 1908: 67). Like the astronomer 
ike the mathematician who knows 
Lgle are equal to two right angles', 
things of the Spirit, as it were in 
sh, can discern them without, or 
ture or reason' ( 1908: 68). 
these examples between scientific 
l senses is their instantaneity of dis­
as finding a different commonality: 
demonstration. He rightly points 
.s geometry' which seeks truth by 
>f matter and appearance' (Pyper 
his dualistic thinking to Barclay: 
Ltion his ideal form of truth' ( 1908: 
over the physical. The prevailing 
1een centred on the head, on men­
he eye, the ear, and the activity of 
to be relegated . .  .' ( 1908: 1 1- 12). 
inference from someone using 
s, Barclay is, I believe, more subtle 
KEISER TOUCHED AND KNIT IN THE LIFE 
and more consistent with his Quaker perspective than this. What he in 
fact likens to the scientific in the religious is instantaneous discern­
ment-'in prima instantia, i.e. at the first blush'. Moreover, the nature 
of this discerning is not grasping an idea through rational abstraction nor 
axiomatic argument separate from the senusous world; it is rather a 
'savor[ing]'. As has been seen, Barclay does not privilege, as the Catholic 
and Protestant traditions do, the physical senses of sight and hearing, but 
rather speaks of the inward spritual sense working through all the five 
senses. The spiritual light, as well, works through, not separate from, 
reason: to 'be rightly and comfortably ordered in natural things [is] to 
have their reason enlightened by this divine and pure light' -and the 
same for conscience (Barclay 1908: 144-45). 
Barclay's Christology 
Similarly I would argue that there is no dualism either in Barclay's 
Christology when he is speaking from experience. The divine indwells 
both Jesus and us; the difference is in degree. Within a trinitarian con­
text-without working out a trinitarian doctrine (that is, without 
working out the nature of the three persons and how they relate to one 
another)-Barclay says there is no knowing the Father except through 
the Son, and no knowing the Son except through the Spirit ( 1908: 34). 
Father, Son and Spirit dwell within the outward man Jesus and within 
all humans. The difference is that 'the fulness of the Godhead dwelt 
bodily' in Jesus. Each person has a measure of the divine within: 'God 
hath communicated and given unto every man a measure of the light of 
his own Son, a measure of grace, or a measure of the Spirit' ( 1908: 132). 
But only Jesus has the fullest measure. 
Barclay speaks here of Son 'or' Spirit. Like Fox and other early 
Friends, he does not separate Son and Spirit as metaphysically distinct as 
the classical Greek influenced tradition does. The divine present in Jesus 
is the Son; in us and in the world it is the Spirit. But since the divine 
presence is Spirit for Barclay, he speaks of the divine in Jesus not only as 
Son but as Spirit as well. Since the Spirit as divine presence is central to 
his theology, his doctrine of the Spirit only appears deficient, as Pyper 
insists, if measured by the abstract metaphysical categories of Greek 
Christian rationalism. But Barclay and early Friends offer an alternative 
to this mode of thinking with their experiential approach. 
Barclay introduces a notion into his Christology that I do not know 
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of Fox or other Quakers using. He says that all people have the divine 
dwelling within through a 'vehiculum Dei, or the spiritual body of Christ, 
the flesh and blood of Christ, which came down from heaven, of which 
all the saints do feed, and are thereby nourished unto eternal life' ( 1908: 
137). This is a vehicle or a medium, or what he calls 'the organ or 
instrument of God' ( 1831: 577). It is 'a spiritual, heavenly, and invisible 
principle, in which God, as Father, Son and Spirit, dwells; a measure of 
which divine and glorious life is in all men as a seed, which of its own 
nature, draws, invites, and inclines to God'. God and Christ are present 
in this agency: 'God and Christ are wrapped up therein' and 'it is never 
separated from God nor Christ' ( 1908: 13 7). He also calls this vehicle 
the 'light', 'seed', and 'Christ' ( 1908: 14 1-42). The difference this makes 
between Jesus and other humans is that God dwells immediately in 
Jesus, but mediately (that is, through this instrumental medium) in all 
others: 'Christ dwells in us, yet not immediately, but mediately, as he is 
in that seed, which is in us; whereas he, to wit, the Eternal Word, 
which was with God, and was God, dwelt immediately in that holy 
man' ( 1908: 138). Christ dwells 'mediately' in us as a seed but Christ 
dwells 'immediately' in Jesus, not as a seed, but in its maturest measure. 
The work of the divine in us through this instrument is to redeem us. 
Redemption is the transformation of the self by raising it to new life. 
This seed of God in us begins to grow so that 'Christ comes to be 
formed and brought forth' ( 1908: 14 1). This means that people are 
brought 'to a sense of their own misery' and become 'sharers in the 
sufferings of Christ inwardly' and 'partakers of his resurrection, in 
becoming holy, pure, and righteous, and recovered out of their sins' 
( 1908: 132). Redemption is, therefore, a present event within the 
inwardness of a self Whatever the connection between the past event of 
God working in the historic Jesus and someone's present redemption, 
redemption is the transformation of the self, the forming of Christ 
within the individual self-growing into a spiritual maturity of a God 
pervaded life. 
What then is this connection? The atonement language Barclay uses 
shows the influence of the classic theory of atonement put forward by 
Abelard. Barclay says that Christ 'gave himself a ransom for all' as 'a 
reason of God's love to the world' ( 1908: 121). Like Abelard's God who 
woos us to tum to him, for Barclay 'God, in and by this Light and Seed, 
invites, calls, exhorts, and strives with every man in order to save him' 
( 1908: 132). While he does sometimes use language of the Anselmian 
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transaction model of atonement-'sacrifice', 'transacted', 'satisfactory 
sacrifice', 'purchased' ( 1908: 140, 172)-he does not talk about a 
historical event in which God 'satisfies' his justice while managing to be 
merciful to humans. The death of Christ for Barclay is not a transaction 
but a revelation, a divine manifestation focused in love upon persons, 
not upon God's maintenance of his own rectitude. The biblical portrait 
of Christ reveals what is revealed within each person but it is only the 
inward revelation, the inward taste, within each person that saves, not 
the knowledge of Jesus as the historical revelation of God. 
Salvation does only come, for Barclay, through 'the name JESUS 
indeed' ( 1908: 180). But this does not mean an outward knowing of the 
biblical Christ but an inward knowing of the divine presence within­
even if one is ignorant of the biblical tradition: 
I confess there is no other name to be saved by: but salvation lieth not in 
the literal, but in the experimental knowledge; albeit, those that have the 
literal knowledge are not saved by it, without this real experimental 
knowledge: yet those that have the real knowledge may be saved without 
the external (1908: 180). 
The light which saves 'could not be understood of Christ's person' but 
'must be that inward spiritual light that shines in their [all people's] 
hearts' ( 1908: 16 1). 
Just as people are inclined to evil after Adam's fall, though they may 
be ignorant of Adam, so also Christ can transform the self within even 
though the person never has heard of the historical Jesus: 'many may 
come to feel the influence of this holy and divine seed and light, and be 
turned from evil to good by it, though they knew nothing of Christ's 
coming in the flesh'. Barclay ends this sentence: 'through whose obedi­
ence and sufferings it is purchased unto them' ( 1908: 14 1). Yet the 
'purchase' is not a transaction but revelation, since the seed and light 
have been at work throughout the history of the world transforming 
people, before as well as after the historical event of Jesus. Barclay 
explicitly redefines 'purchase' in terms of revelation: 'we witness this 
capacity brought into act, whereby receiving and not resisting the pur­
chase of his death, to wit, the light, spirit, and grace of Christ revealed in 
us' ( 1908: 199). 
Knowing the outward biblical Christ does make a difference. It 
'humble [s]', 'strengthen [s]', 'encourage [s]', provides an 'excellent pattern' 
and 'example that we should follow his steps', 'edifie [s] and refreshe [s]'. 
'The history then is profitable and comfortable with the mystery, and 
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never without it; but the mystery is and may be profitable without the 
explicit and outward knowledge of the history'. In fact, if you are aware 
of the biblical tradition, Barclay says, 'it is absolutely needful that those 
do believe the history of Christ's outward appearance, whom it pleased 
God to bring to the knowledge of it' (1908: 141). 
Christ dwells in all. Any and all can respond to this light and seed, and 
have them fructifY within to the raising up of new life in God, saved out 
of sin into purity of life. Yet Barclay qualifies 'Christ' here. He distin­
guishes between Christ as seed within the self and Christ as growing and 
formed up into new life. In the latter sense Christ is not present in every­
one. Christ is only present in everyone as the divine seed that has the 
potential to grow into maturity and to illuminate the darkness of control 
over life by one's own will and wisdom. Only if the vehiculum Dei or 
seed or light 'is received and closed with in the heart, Christ comes to 
be formed and brought forth: but we are far from ever having said, that 
Christ is thus formed in all men, or in the wicked'. 'Neither is Christ in 
all men by way of union, or. . .inhabitation' but 'is in all men as in a 
seed'. In this sense, as a seed, Christ is within everyone (1908: 141-42). 
The self is entirely passive to saving grace-in its initial workings. The 
selfs nature is 'wholly corrupted' (1908: 147) so it cannot save itself. 
This corruption is not imputed from Adam, yet each person repeats 
Adam's sin when 'they actually join with it' (1908: 98). For this reason 
Barclay says Quakers speak of 'the old Adam, in which all sin is . . .  and 
not that of original sin' (1908: 109). Righteousness through justification 
is not imputed but actual: 'by this justification by Christ . . .  we understand 
the formation of Christ in us . . .  this inward birth in us, bringing forth 
righteousness and holiness in us' (1908: 199). In justification we are 
'being made really righteous, and not merely a being reputed such' 
(1908: 208). While the self cannot 'move one step out of the natural 
condition, until the grace lay hold upon him', it does have the nature to 
be 'capable to be wrought upon by the grace of God' and the capacity 
to resist or receive it: 'he that resists its striving, is the cause of his own 
condemnation; he that resists it not, it becomes his salvation'. So 'the 
first step is not by man's working, but by his not contrary working'. 
And after the initial step by grace, the self cooperates with grace: 
'afterwards, as man is wrought upon, there is a will raised in him, by 
which he comes to be a co-worker with the grace' (1908: 147). Endy is 
right that grace is indispensable but the self is not annihilated. Rather it 
is reordered, as it was originally meant to be, so the divine, rather than 
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the natural will and wisdom, pervades and guides the self. 
So here there is no dualism separating the biblical, historical Christ and 
the inward Christ. For those who assume redemption is a transaction, as 
Creasey does, such an emphasis on inward transformation would split 
the inward Christ from the objective Christ of the Bible. But Barclay's 
view of redemption is not transactional but revelatory: what was fully 
present in the historical Jesus and recorded in the Bible is what can be 
revealed in varying measures within every person from the beginning of 
time, as God, as seed or light, strives from within each person to get 
them to receive and not resist the growth of this seed. 
If Barclay's view of redemption is not dualistic, is there, nevertheless, 
an influence of Descartes' subject/ object split on his notion of the 
vehiculum Dei as it separates the historical Christ from other humans? 
Barclay does separate the divine and human here, but not because of 
Descartes. Rather he proposes this out of a commitment to the christo­
logical tradition, that maintains the impassibility of God: God the Father 
does not suffer because he is not divisible into parts. Barclay conceives a 
vehiculum Dei because 'the seed, grace, and word of God, and light' 
strive with the self and are 'crucified' by human response, but this is: 
'not the proper essence, and nature of God precisely taken'. God 'is not 
divisible into parts and measures', because God is 'a most pure, simple 
being, void of all composition or division', who 'therefore can neither 
be resisted, hurt, wounded, [nor] crucified' ( 1908: 137). While this insis­
tence that God in essence is simple and undivided whereas we are finite 
and partial is a curious mortgage to his past theological education at the 
Catholic Scots College of Paris, he qualifies this disjunction between 
God and self by conceiving of the entire trinity, and not merely the Son, 
as indwelling the seed or light, and thus indwelling everyone. While 
God and self are distinguishable ontologically, they interact intimately as 
the undivided God dwells mediately within us and engenders our 
growing up in Christ-just as whole and part are different yet interact. 
Barclay's Apologetic Use of Cartesianism 
What we have seen so far is that there is no dualism in Barclay when he 
is reflecting on his own religious experience. The supernatural sense 
works through the natural senses to discern the moving of the Spirit 
within the spirits of those gathered together bodily in silence. Evoked by 
grace, the self is actuated into being more fully itself, being united with 
others, and becoming an active co-worker with the divine. The divine 
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he discovers within as the inward Christ is the same Spirit manifest in 
fullness in the outward Christ of Scripture. Nevertheless, within a year 
of the publication of his Apology, in his 'The Possibility and Necessity of 
the Inward and Immediate Revelation of the Spirit of God', he employs 
Cartesian dualism in response to Adrian Paets, a Dutch diplomat and 
philosopher. Here Barclay separates mind and body, denies synaesthesia, 
denigrates the body as brutish, and affirms innate ideas. What can 
explain this apparent capitulation to Descartes' dualism? 
Most of Barclay's published theology, as evident in the title of his 
Apology, is 'apologetic'. What this technical theological term means, as 
he says at the outset of his magnum opus, is 'to declare and defend the 
truth' ( 1908: ix). Apologetic theology addresses people of a different 
point of view and seeks to defend one's own views against their criticism 
and to persuade them at least of the reasonableness of one's own views if 
not their truth . The way in which this is done is by finding common 
ground with one's critics. The Bible and the Protestant theological 
tradition obviously provide common ground between Quakers, Puritans, 
and Anglicans. Hence his frequent references to Scripture, Protestant 
doctrines, and general reasonableness; yet when he presents common 
texts he invariably gives a Quaker interpretation. This often leaves his 
audience dissatisfied, yet they must admit that there is some basis in 
Scripture, tradition, and/ or reason for his view-as Adrian Paets recog­
nized, according to Barclay's report, that Quakers 'could make a reason­
able plea for the foundation of their religion' (Barclay 1831: 562). 
Why then does he use Descartes in responding to Paets? To write 
apologetics is to let your opponent set the agenda to which you respond. 
Descartes had become all the rage among erudite thinkers both on the 
continent and in England. Not that people necessarily agreed with him, 
but serious thinkers knew they had to deal with him. When the Dutch 
thinker wrote to Barclay making the Cartesian separation of outward 
senses from the mind, Barclay wrote back in kind, using the coin of the 
realm. 
Paets works from the empiricist side of the outward senses of the 
Cartesian split, arguing, according to Barclay, that the Christian religion, 
based on Christ Jesus, is merely 'contingent truth' because it deals with 
the 'matter of fact' of history. Since matters of fact can only be known 
by the outward senses and since 'God cannot make a contingent truth to 
become a necessary truth', then faith only comes through the outward 
sense of hearing, as he understands Paul to have meant when he said: 
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'Faith cometh by hearing' (Rom. 10. 17) (Barclay 1831: 565-66). 
Barclay is wrestling with what will later be known as 'Lessing's ugly 
ditch'. In 1777 Gotthold Lessing wrote: 'accidental truths of history can 
never become the proof of necessary truths of reason'. He calls this dis­
tinction between historical and rational truth 'the ugly, broad ditch 
which I cannot get across, however often and however earnestly I have 
tried to make the leap' (Lessing 1967: 53, 55). Where Lessing desired a 
certainty on the other side of the ugly ditch, Paets has an answer which 
satisfies him on this side of the ditch that the truth comes by hearing the 
gospel preached. 
Barclay, however, requires more certitude and intimacy than contin­
gent history provides. Taking the rationalist side of Descartes' split, he 
looks for truth, as Descartes does, within rather than outside the self. 
And like Descartes, he insists on certainty-indeed, 'infallibility', since 
he approves of Catholics' desire for certainty, though not their locating 
it in the church tradition ( 1831: 562-63). He locates it, rather, in inward 
immediate divine revelation, by God speaking directly within the soul. 
He likens the certainty of such supernatural revelation to the certainty of 
a necessary truth of definition: 'that this proposition, every divine reve­
lation is necessarily true, is as clear and evident, as that proposition, that 
every whole is greater than its part' ( 183 1: 570). Using Descartes' 
criterion for truth (see Descartes 1951: 203-204), such truth is 'clear and 
evident' or 'clearly and distinctly known' (Barclay 1831: 575). 
Pyper takes such talk as evidence of Barclay's capitulation to 
Descartes. He argues, further, that the belief that 'God can and does 
implant contingent truths in our minds, and by that act they become 
eternal truth' (Pyper 1998: 12) fits with Barclay's use of geometrical 
analogies that seemingly denigrate historical knowledge. As I have 
shown, however, the point of such geometrical analogies is not their 
disembodied rational conceptualizing but their instantaneity of under­
standing that is sensing and trusting. While Barclay does speak of God 
making contingent truths of history into eternal truths, this is not an 
assertion of reason's capacity to work separately from historical exis­
tence. Rather Barclay makes this claim through an appeal to experience. 
Those few occasions of God implanting historical truths in people's 
minds were when prophets were enabled to foretell various characteris­
tics of the historical event of Jesus (Barclay 183 1: 56 7). But the truth of 
Jesus is not that of outward facts, whether known in anticipation or 
looking back, but the inward truth of the eternal Christ. Since Christ 
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dwells within all of us, we can know this inward truth without knowing 
the historical facts of Jesus. When attending to Jesus, we only know the 
spiritual truth about him by grasping the inward truth in him that is 
already within us. This is not denigrating history but affirming that its 
important meaning is not outward but inward, which we only know by 
engaging our inwardness with it. 
In answering Paets, Barclay does separate mind and body: 'the mind 
can move itself; and operate in itself; which a body cannot do: but a 
body can be moved by another' (183 1 :  577) . He isolates the function of 
each sense from the others (denying what today is called 'synaesthia'): 'it 
is no less absurd . . .  to require us to see sounds, and hear light and colours'. 
He denigrates the body: restricting knowing God to the outward senses, 
as Paets does, 'turn [s] men into brutes' since the outward senses 'the 
beasts have common with us' (183 1 :  571) .  
With Descartes, Barclay also affirms innate ideas: 'the ideas of all 
things are divinely planted in our souls' (183 1 :  575; cf. Copleston 1963: 
93-95) . Rejecting empiricism's belief that ideas are caused by things 
imprinting themselves through the physical senses on the mind, he says 
that external things 'stir up' ideas but cannot form them. These 'divinely 
planted' ideas: 
are not begotten in us by outward objects, or outward causes . . .  but only 
are by these outward things excited or stirred up . . . for the outward object 
does nothing, but imprint in our sensible organs a corporal motion. Now 
there is nothing in a corporal motion, that can form in us the ideas of 
those things; for all ideas are of a spiritual nature? [sic] Now, nothing that 
is corporal, can produce that which is spiritual, because the less excellent 
cannot produce the more excellent, else the effect would exceed its 
cause .. . (Barclay 1831: 576). 
Barclay explicitly accepts that there is a 'natural idea of God, which 
Cartesius and his followers so much talk of', that all persons have 'some 
sort of idea of God, as of a most perfect being' (183 1 :  575, 574) and says 
that our supernatural ideas are also 'stirred up' but by divine causality, 
which he calls 'the organ or instrument of God' (183 1 :  577), the same as 
the vehiculum Dei (1908: 137) . 
In separating mind and body and accepting innate ideas, Barclay is so 
intent on finding commonality with Paets's Cartesianism that he does 
not recognize the opposition between his own relational reflections and 
Cartesian dualism. He has obviously not raised to self-consciousness the 
implications of his relational method and its affirmation of embodied­
ness-of spiritual senses working through the outward senses and of 
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inward experience occurring through the physical gathering of Friends 
in silent meeting for worship. Nor does he distinguish his experiential 
approach from Descartes' rationalism but feels comfortable using Paets's 
Cartesian language because he knows in his own experience of meeting 
for worship the stirring up of words by the divine presence innate 
within the self, even though we can see with 350 years of hindsight that 
this is a far cry from Descartes' rationalistic understanding of inwardness. 
The Usefulness of Barclay's Relational Approach 
A commonality exists between Descartes and Quakerism, even though 
they are fundamentally opposed, and Barclay mined this similarity in his 
apologetic writing to Adrian Paets. Barclay, like Descartes, starts with 
the individual in its interiority and what it can know within with cer­
tainty. Authority for both is in nothing external but is found within 
inwardness. The nature of that inwardness is, however, very different .  
For Descartes i t  i s  explicit reason searching out its own rational founda­
tion which becomes the basis for all further philosophical reflection. For 
Barclay it is a dimension of spiritual sensing, not reasoning, of being 
touched in the heart and the life. While Descartes' knower is isolated 
from its own body and community of knowers, Barclay speaks of being 
knit into the life of others and of the Spirit as they sit together in silence 
or go about their daily lives. Certainty is similarly important, but comes 
for Descartes through doubt that eats away at all relations in search of an 
absolute idea that can be held beyond trust. For Barclay it comes 
through the sensing and trusting of experience felt within the inward­
ness of the individual self in the world and in community. 
Barclay has lifted the phrase 'clear and distinct' from Descartes and 
uses it to describe our grasp of truth. For Descartes, it means rational 
clarity; for Barclay, however, since the true is discerned through a sense 
not reason, it means spontaneity and immediacy of discernment-it 
tastes true at first blush . Certainty comes in relatedness for Barclay; for 
Descartes it comes in detachment. Only in his response to Paets does 
Barclay speak of 'stirring ideas'. This is an inadequate description of the 
process by which he knows, in his experience of the silence, the moving 
and actuating, the stirring, power of the Spirit, which can bring us to 
speech. While there is a commonality of being stirred to thoughts by an 
agency beyond self, the emergence of words from the tacit depths of 
silent meeting is not Cartesian. 
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When he is arguing apologetically with Paets, Barclay depends on 
Cartesian categories. But when he reflects on his own experience, he 
does not. When he is philosophically alert in his apologetic theology, he 
is confronted with two options: empiricism or rationalism-either truth 
comes by the outward senses or by the inward seeing of reason. While 
his non-dualistic reflections on religious experience had implications for 
a third philosophical method, he was unaware of this option. Today in 
the wake of twentieth-century existential, phenomenological, postcriti­
cal, and feminist thought, we can grasp a way of thinking that is neither 
objective nor subjective, but reflective on our being in the world. 
Barclay did not realize the philosophical potential of his religious 
reflections and so, faced with these two alternatives, chose the Cartesian 
inward side but redefined it, not as lucid consciousness, but as the place 
of spiritual experience and sensing that works through reason and the 
natural senses. 
When he engaged apologetically with the empiricist Paets, he argued 
for inwardness using Cartesian categories. Whether we interpret Barclay 
as having generally capitulated to Cartesianism depends on whether we 
view him through his apologetic or his experiential approaches. Because 
he says explicitly that it was his experience of the life in a silent meeting 
that brought him into Quakerism and because he develops theological 
reflection, as we have seen, from such experience, I see the experiential 
approach as fundamental to Barclay's theology. From this perspective, I 
have argued, there is no dualism in his articulation of the nature of self, 
God, and Christ. I think, therefore, that his evident engagement with 
Cartesian dualism did not distort his theology, although it was seriously 
employed in answering a philosophically astute non-Quaker. While we 
might regret his preoccupation with apologetics and wish he had 
become more aware of the relational method implicit in his theological 
reflections, he did, in fact, use it as he reflected at length on his own 
experience and its background of silence, within the context of the 
Christian theological heritage. 
If he had shifted from apologetics with dualists to theology as 
reflection upon experience, he could have restructured his Apology by 
beginning with his experience on first entering 'the silent assemblies of 
God's people' ( 1908: 340). It could still be apologetics, seeking common 
ground, however, not with dualistic reason but with holistic experience 
of being human-as we feel, know, and speak, as we relate to divinity 
and other selves in the world, informed by the biblical heritage. Within 
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the laboratory that is Barclay's thought as reflection upon experience,  
we can discover a way of doing Quaker theology that responds to 
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